






1.1      Definition 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL): is an analysis to establish the target safety level or 
target risk level and provide guidelines to evaluate the process risk and implement safety 
systems of the required integrity in order to achieve the established target risk levels 
 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA): is a semiquantitative tool for analyzing 
and assessing risk. LOPA is an analysis tool that typically builds on the information 
developed during a qualitative hazard evaluation, such as a process hazard analysis 
(PHA).SIL and LOPA can be used in process safety and both are widely used in some 
developed companies. 
 
1.2 History of LOPA 
There has been much discussion about the number of and strength of protection 
layers. This sometimes made using subjective arguments, emotional appeals and 
persistence of an individual. LOPA answer the key questions using rational, objective, 
risk-based approach. The individual protection layers provided are analyzed for their 
effectiveness in LOPA. Then, the combined effects of the protection layers are 
compared against risk tolerance criteria. The genesis of this method was suggested in 
two publications: 
 In the late 1980s, the Chemical Manufacturers Association published the 
Responsible Care® Process Safety Code of Management Practices which 
included ―sufficient layers of protection‖ as one of the recommended 
components of an effective process safety management system (American 
Chemistry Council, 2000).  
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 In 1993, CCPS published its Guidelines for Safe Automation of Chemical 
Processes. Although it was called the risk-based SIS integrity level method, 
LOPA was suggested as one method to determine the integrity level for safety 
instrumented functions (SIFs). ―Interlock‖ is an older, imprecise term for SIF. 
The method used was not as fully developed as the LOPA technique described in 
this book. However, it did indicate a path forward, which was pursued by several 
companies independently.  
 
The initial development of LOPA was done internally within individual 
companies, in some cases focusing on existing processes. However, once a method had 
been developed and refined, several companies published papers describing the driving 
forces behind their efforts to develop the method, their experience with LOPA, and 
examples of its use. In particular, the papers and discussion among the attendees at the 
CCPS International Conference and Workshop on Risk Analysis in Process Safety in 
Atlanta in October 1997 brought agreement that a book describing the LOPA method 
should be developed. In parallel with these efforts, discussions took place on the 
requirements for the design of safety instrumented functions (SIF) to provide the 
required PFDs (probability of failure on demand). United States [ISA S84.01, (ISA, 
1996)] and international standards [(IEC 61508, (IEC, 1998)] and [IEC 61511, (IEC, 
2001)] described the architecture and design features of SIFs. Informative sections of the 
ISA and IEC standards suggested methods to determine the required SIL (safety 
integrity level), but LOPA was not mentioned until the draft of IEC 61511, Part 3 
appeared in late 1999. These issues were summarized in the CCPS workshop on the 
application of ISA S84.01. In response to all this activity, CCPS assembled in 1998 a 
team from A. D. Little, ARCO Chemical, Dow  Chemical, DuPont, Factory Mutual, 
ABS Consulting (includes former JBF Associates), International Specialty Products, 
Proctor and Gamble (P&G), Rhodia, Rohm and Haas, Shell (Equilon), and Union 




1.3 Problem Statement 
 
Many practical issues need to be addressed in order to arrive at risk based 
solution. Some of the related issues include identification of target risk levels, 
identification of the hazardous events associated with the process under consideration, 
establishing the existing risk associated with the process, and selection of the appropriate 
non-instrumented safety systems to meet the target risk. Thus, a methodology is required 
to establish the requirements of the safety instrumented system and the safety integrity 
levels (SIL). Establishing the target risk levels are based on national and international 
standards and regulations, corporate policies supported by good engineering practices or 
input from concerned parties. Losses such as injuries and fatalities to employees or the 
public, damage to the environment, or financial losses are the terms to express the target 
risk levels. The target risk levels can be defined for a process, a plant or a corporation. 
 
LOPA can be effectively used at any point in the life cycle of a process or a 
facility. LOPA is used in research, process development, process design, operations, 
maintenance, modifications and decommissioning. Those are the important reason why 
LOPA is needed. 
 
In April 2009, Petronas Penapisan Melaka (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd (PP(M)SB) 
planned to establish Layer Of Protection Analysis (LOPA) Procedure and train our own 
LOPA analysts. Current guideline that PP(M)SB had only general data of Initiating 
Event Frequency (IEF) and Probability Failure Data (PFD) that are given from CCPS 
LOPA. Therefore, current IEE and PFD are not related to the company experience (i.e. 
historical data, operator experience). The general data is not always true especially in 





The objectives of this project are: 
 To determine the Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) for hazardous installation by using 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA). 
 To implement LOPA procedure in the real situation. An industry plant operation 
           will be the case study in this project.  
 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
This project will be started with gathering information and theoretical knowledge 
on Safety Integrity Levels (SIL). The methods that can be used in determining the SIL 
will be listed out. One of the listed methods will be used as the technique to determine 
SIL. In this case, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) will be used as the risk 
assessment technique to determine SIL for hazardous installation. The related 
information on LOPA will be defined as LOPA will be used to complete this project. 
This method will be applied in the real application in industry as a real case study. 
Meanwhile, further research on this project will be continuously practiced as it is 
















LOPA is a simplified form of risk assessment. LOPA typically uses order of magnitude 
categories for initiating event frequency, consequence severity, and the likelihood of 
failure of independent protection layers (IPLs) to approximate the risk of a scenario. 
LOPA is an analysis tool that typically builds on the information developed during a 
qualitative hazard evaluation, such as a process hazard analysis (PHA). LOPA is 
implemented using a set of rules. 
 
2.1 Selecting Safety Integrity Levels 
 
 2.1.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of a safety instrumented system (SIS) is to reduce the risk that a 
process may become hazardous to a tolerable level. The SIS does this by decreasing the 
frequency of unwanted accidents. The amount of risk reduction that an SIS can provide 
is represented by its safety integrity level (SIL), which is defined as a range of 
probability of failure on demand. The method organizations use to select SILs should be 
based: 
 Their risk of accident 
 An evaluation of the potential consequences and likelihoods of an accident 
 An evaluation of the effectiveness of all relevant process safeguards 
Selecting an SIL, should involve considering relevant laws, regulations, and national and 




 2.1.2 Safety Integrity Level 
 
 SILs are categories based on the probability of failure on demand (PFD) for a 
particular safety instrumented function. The SIL is the key design parameter specifying 
the amount of risk reduction that the safety equipment is required to achieve for a 
particular function in question. If an SIL is not selected, the equipment cannot be 
properly designed because only the action is specified, not integrity. To properly design 
a piece of equipment, two types of specifications are required: 
 A specification of what the equipment does  
 A specification of how well the equipment performs that function. 
The SIL addresses this second specification by indicating the minimum probability that 
the equipment will successfully do what it is designed to do when it is called upon to do 
it. Selecting SIL involves giving a numerical target upon which subsequent steps in the 
safety life cycle based. Thus SIL selection offers an important guide when you are 
selecting equipment and making maintenance decisions. 
 
 2.1.3 SIL Selection and Risk 
 
  The reason of an organization should use a systematic methodology, 
which includes layer of protection analysis (LOPA), to select SIL is to make the choice 
that best reduces risk. To make the best decision about SIL, designer needs to 
completely understand not only the potential likelihood of an unwanted event, but also 
the possible consequences of that event. Once the risk is known, one must determine hoe 
to reduce that risk to a tolerable risk. The amount of risk that an organization is willing 





2.2 Purpose of LOPA 
 
The primary purpose of LOPA is to determine the sufficient layers of protection 
against an accident scenario. The layers of protection of a scenario depend on the 
process complexity and potential severity of the consequences.  
 
2.3 Overview of LOPA 
 
LOPA is a simplified form of risk assessment. LOPA typically uses order of 
magnitude categories for initiating event frequency, consequence severity, and the 
likelihood of failure of independent protection layers (IPLs) to approximate the risk of a 
scenario. LOPA is an analysis tool that typically builds on the information developed 
during a qualitative hazard evaluation, such as a process hazard analysis (PHA). LOPA 
is implemented using a set of rules. 
 
The primary purpose of LOPA is to determine if there are sufficient layers of 
protection against an accident scenario. A scenario may require one or many protection 
layers depending on the process complexity and potential severity of a consequence. 
Only one layer must work successfully for the consequence to be prevented. However, 
since no layer is perfectly effective, sufficient protection layers must be provided to 
render the risk of the accident tolerable. 
 
LOPA provides a consistent basis for judging whether there are sufficient IPLs to 
control the risk of an accident for a given scenario. If the estimated risk of a scenario is 
not acceptable, additional IPLs may be added. Alternatives encompassing inherently 
safer design can be evaluated as well. LOPA does not suggest which IPLs to add or 
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which design to choose, but it assists in judging between alternatives for risk mitigation. 
LOPA is not a fully quantitative risk assessment approach, but is rather a simplified 
method for assessing the value of protection layers for a well-defined accident scenario. 
 
LOPA provides a risk analyst with a method to reproducibly evaluate the risk of 
selected accident scenarios. A scenario is typically identified during a qualitative hazard 
evaluation (HE). LOPA is applied after an unacceptable consequence, and a credible 
cause for it, is selected. It then provides an order of magnitude approximation of the risk 
of a scenario. In many applications of LOPA, the goal of the analyst is to identify all 
cause–consequence pairs that can exceed the organization‘s tolerance for risk.  
 
2.4 When to use LOPA 
 
LOPA is typically applied after a qualitative hazard evaluation using the 
scenarios identified by the qualitative hazard review team. However, LOPA can also be 
used to analyze scenarios that originate from any source, including design option 
analysis and incident investigations. LOPA can also be applied when a hazard evaluation 
team:  
 Believes a scenario is too complex for the team to make a reasonable risk 
judgment using purely qualitative judgment, or 
 The consequences are too severe to rely solely on qualitative risk judgment. 
 
LOPA can also be used as a screening tool prior to a more rigorous quantitative risk 
assessment method. When used as a screening tool, each scenario above a specified 
consequence or risk level will first go through LOPA analysis, and then certain scenarios 
will be targeted for a higher level of risk assessment. The decision to proceed to CPQRA 
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is typically based on the risk level determined by LOPA or based on the opinion of the 
LOPA analyst. 
 
2.5 Implementing LOPA 
 
LOPA is most effective when an organization adopts a consistent approach to 
LOPA and sets criteria for when to use LOPA and who is qualified to use it. LOPA can 
be applied in a team setting to identify accident scenarios. LOPA can also be applied by 
a single analyst; in this case, the scenarios have typically already been identified for the 
analyst. 
 
2.6 Benefits of LOPA 
 
 LOPA has many benefits that justify investment by company management and 
risk analysts. As with most new tools, however, the benefits often cannot be fully 
appreciated until LOPA is applied to everyday problems. Some general benefits of 
LOPA include: 
 LOPA requires less time than quantitative risk analysis. This benefit applies 
particularly to scenarios that are too complex for qualitative assessment of risk. 
 LOPA helps resolve conflicts in decision making by providing a consistent, 
simplified framework for estimating the risk of a scenario and provides a 
common language for discussing risk. LOPA provides a better risk decision basis 
compared to subjective or emotional arguments based on ―the risk is tolerable to 
me.‖ This is particularly beneficial for organizations making the transition from 
qualitative to more quantitative risk methods. 
 LOPA can improve the efficiency of hazard evaluation meetings by providing a 
tool to help reach risk judgments quicker. 
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 LOPA facilitates the determination of more precise cause–consequence pairs, 
and therefore improves scenario identification. 
 It is more accurate than purely qualitative estimates. 
































LOPA includes the method that falls between qualitative and quantitative methods. 
There are several steps involve in developing this analysis. Below is the summarization 
of the steps or methodologies that to be used in for the whole project: 
 Step 1: Identify the consequences to screen the scenarios 
 Step 2: Select an accident scenarios 
 Step 3: Identify the initiating event of the scenario and determine the initiating 
event frequency (events per year)  
 Step 4: Identify the IPLs and estimate the probability of failure on demand of 
each IPL. 
 Step 5: Estimate the risk of the scenarios by mathematically combining the 
consequences, initiating event, and IPL data 
 
The above description of the methodologies will lead in determining the SIL for 
hazardous installation. Below is the summary of the methodologies to be used in 
implementing LOPA. 
 
STEP 1: ESTIMATING CONSEQUENCES AND SEVERITY 
In LOPA, the consequences are estimated to an order of magnitude of severity. There 
various types of consequence analysis used in LOPA. Consequences are the undesirable 
outcomes of accident scenarios. Consequence evaluation is an integral part of any risk 
assessment methodology. The risk associated with the accident scenarios, and the risk 
assessment methodology adopted by the organization, and the resources the organization 
is willing to expend to refine the estimate are the factors of what consequences should be 
evaluated and how rigorously the consequences are evaluated. The different types of 
consequence evaluation are: 
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 Release size/characterization 
 Simplified injury/fatality estimates 
 Simplified injury/fatality estimates with adjustments 
 Detailed injury/fatality estimates 
 
The method used for consequence categorization: 
Method 1:  Category Approach without Direct Reference to Human Harm  
This method typically uses matrices to differentiate consequences into various 
categories. It avoids estimating the number of potential injuries or fatalities, thereby: 
 Avoiding any overt appearance that injuries and fatalities are tolerable  
 Helping the team make more accurate judgments about relative risk, since it is 
very difficult to estimate qualitatively the number of people who might be 
harmed and how severe the harm might be. A  toxic release can result in 
one or more fatalities or no harm at all, depending on the proximity of people to 
the release point and the time and capability they have to escape. 
 
The advantages of this method: 
 The method is simple and easy to use because the size and properties of the 
release are relatively easy to assess. No case-by-case modeling is required. A 
release of a certain size is assigned a certain consequence value independent of 
the eventual effect (fire, explosion, toxic release, injury, fatality, etc.). The 
criteria for loss of production are similarly simple to assess. 
 When combined with a matrix showing the organization‘s risk tolerance criteria, 





Method 2: Qualitative Estimates with Human Harm 
This method uses the final impact to humans as the consequence of interest, but arrives 
at the value using purely qualitative judgment. For each scenario, the human 
consequences are estimated directly by the LOPA analyst, using past experience, 
previously generated look-up tables, or knowledge of prior detailed release modeling of 
similar releases.  
 
The advantages of this method are: 
 Simplicity of understanding: Many people tend to better understand 
consequence in terms of harm rather than expressing risk in terms of release size. 
 Direct comparison with corporate guidelines: Many companies already have 
established guidelines for risk of a fatality/injury, or for risk of a certain 
monetary loss. 
 
The disadvantages of this method are: 
 Implicit assumptions for the probability of ignition for flammable releases, for 
the probability of injury, and the probability that a person is present in the area 
may over- or underestimate the risk of fatality. 
 Look-up tables are even less precise (more subjective) than release 
categorization tables. 
 The estimation of the consequence severity may vary between different analysts, 
unless some guidance is provided across the company. 
 
Method 3: Qualitative Estimates with Human Harm with Adjustments for Post 
Release Probabilities 
Alternatively, the LOPA analyst can initially estimate the magnitude of a release 
―qualitatively‖ similar to Method 2 and then later adjust the event frequency by the 
probability that: 
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 The event will result in a flammable or toxic cloud; 
 For a flammable cloud, an ignition source will be present; 
 An individual will be present in the area when the event occurs; 
 The individual will experience a fatal (or injurious) consequence. 
 
The advantages of this method: 
 Simplicity of understanding: People tend to better understand consequence in 
terms of harm rather than expressing risk in terms of release size. 
 Direct comparison with corporate guidelines: Many companies already have 
established guidelines for risk of a fatality or injury. 
 Frequency adjustments: The frequency adjustments may give a better estimate 
of the risk of human harm. 
 
The disadvantages of this method: 
 The simplifications made in assessing the probabilities of the events subsequent 
to the release. The results of real-world events have proven to be both 
significantly less and significantly greater than those calculated by analysts. 
However, if consistent approaches are used, it is reasonable to expect that this 
method will highlight scenarios with relatively higher risk. 
 Extra parameters for the probability of reaching the stated impact or outcome 
must be included in the risk calculation and these may change over time (e.g., the 
number of people or their location changes). 
 The estimation of the consequence severity may vary between different analysts, 
unless some guidance is provided across the company. 





Method 4: Quantitative Estimates with Human Harm     
This method is similar to the qualitative estimates with human harm method (Method 3), 
but uses detailed analyses in determining the effects of a release and its effects upon 
individuals and equipment. This method involves the use of mathematical models to 
simulate the release itself (also called ―source term‖ modeling), the subsequent 
dispersion, and the toxic or blast/thermal effect. The advantages of this method: 
 A greater degree of certainty concerning the predicted consequences. 
 Direct comparison with corporate guidelines. 
 
The disadvantages of this method: 
 Although the modeling programs are much more sophisticated than the 
estimation methods, the results of real-world events have been both significantly 
less and significantly greater than those calculated by analysts. Modeling results 
are strongly affected by the exact release conditions, atmospheric stability, wind 
direction, time to ignition, etc. There are thousands of possible permutations to 
consider. Inevitably only a few ―representative‖ cases can be chosen. 
 The level of sophistication required for modeling the consequence of a scenario 
is disproportionate to that used to estimate the order of magnitude frequency of 
the scenario with LOPA. 
 The training, experience and effort required to perform the modeling can be 
prohibitive, and such analysis is usually only applied to scenarios that have 
already been judged to have potentially fatal results. 
 
STEP 2: DEVELOPING SCENARIOS 
A scenario is an unplanned event or sequence of events that results in an undesirable 
consequence. Each scenario consists of at least two elements: 
 An initiating event that starts the chain of events and 
 A consequence that results if the chain of events continues without interruption. 
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Each scenario must have a unique initiating event/consequence pair. If the same 
initiating event can result in different consequences, additional scenarios should be 
developed. In some cases many scenarios may spring from a common initiating event 
and separate scenarios should be developed for individual sections of the plant. In 
addition to the initiating event and consequence, a scenario may also include 
 Enabling events or conditions that have to occur or be present before the 
initiating event can result in a consequence  
 The failure of safeguards (which may be IPLs) 
 
Methods that use consequence end-points of fatalities, or harm to business or the 
environment, may also include some or all of the following factors, or outcome 
modifiers, in the scenario: 
 The probability of ignition of a flammable material (liquid or vapor release) 
 The probability of a person being present in the area affected by the event, 
 The probability that a fatal injury will result from exposure to the effects of the 
fire, explosion, or toxic release—includes evacuation or protective action 
 The probability that an estimated financial loss to the facility of a certain 
magnitude will result. 
 
The most common source of information for identifying scenarios is hazard evaluations 
(HE) developed and documented for existing processes and performed during the design 
of new and modified processes. The purpose of an HE is to identify, assess and 
document the hazards associated with the process. Other sources for identifying 
candidate scenarios for LOPA are: 
 Issues related to plant operation. This could involve unexpected behavior, or 
operating conditions outside normal ranges, etc. 
 Incidents in the process, or from other processes, which reveal an initiating event 
or scenario not previously considered or which was not considered credible 
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 The requirement to change the process, which could involve new or modified 
scenarios 
 Interlock reviews to assess whether the safety instrumented function (SIF)—
interlock—is required and, if so, the type of SIF required meeting the corporate 
risk guidelines. 
 
Once a scenario has been identified, it must be developed and documented to the level 
where a basic understanding of the events and safeguards is achieved. The scenario may 
not be initially understood completely and may undergo revisions. New scenarios may 
also be revealed that must be analyzed separately. Once the initiating event is identified 
for a specific scenario, the analyst must determine whether any enabling events or 
conditions are required for the initiating event to lead to the consequence. The next step 
is to confirm that the consequence is stated using the same criteria as the LOPA method. 
 
STEP 3: IDENTIFYING INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY 
For LOPA, each scenario has a single initiating event. The frequency of the initiating 
event is normally expressed in events per year. Some sources use other units, such as 
events per 10
6
 hours. Initiating events are grouped into three general types: external 
events, equipment failures, and human failures. Prior to assigning frequencies to 
initiating events, all causes from the scenario development step should be reviewed and 
verified as valid initiating events for the consequence identified. Any causes that are 
incorrect or inappropriate should be either discarded or developed into valid initiating 
events. Frequency estimation also involves in this stage. This frequency estimation 
measures the failure rate data which consists of sources, selection of failure rates, failure 
rates in LOPA, derivation of initiating event frequency from failure data, time at risk, 




STEP 4: IDENTIFYING INDEPENDENT PROTECTION LAYERS 
An IPL is a device, system, or action that is capable of preventing a scenario from 
proceeding to its undesired consequence independent of the initiating event or the action 
of any other layer of protection associated with the scenario. In order to be considered an 
IPL, a device, system, or action must be 
 Effective in preventing the consequence when it functions as designed, 
 Independent of the initiating event and the components of any other IPL already 
claimed for the same scenario 
 Auditable; the assumed effectiveness in terms of consequence prevention and 
PFD must be capable of validation in some manner 
 
The basic requirements of effectiveness, independence and audit ability for an IPL are 
determined by several methods. The simplest is to use a written design basis, or IPL 
summary sheet, which must be available for review by the LOPA team or analyst. 
 
STEP 5: DETERMINING SCENARIO FREQUENCY 
The following is the general procedure for calculating the frequency for a release 
scenario with a specific consequence endpoint. 
 
       j 
fi
C = fi
I x ∏ PFDij 
                                 j=1 









 is the frequency for consequence C for initiating event i 
fi
I
 is the initiating event frequency for initiating event i 
PFDij is the probability of failure on demand of the jth IPL that protects against 
consequence C for initiating event i. 
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The above equation is applicable for low demand situations—that is, fi
I
 is less than twice 
the test frequency for the first IPL. 
 
STEP 6: MAKING RISK DECISIONS 
Three basic types of risk judgment are used in conjunction with LOPA: 
 The predominant method is to compare the calculated risk with predetermined 
risk tolerance criteria through use of various methods. 
 The second type is expert judgment by a qualified risk analyst, which as noted 
above, is not recommended by the authors but is included for completeness. 
 The third type is relative comparison among competing alternatives for risk 
reduction, using either of the methods described above. 
 
Cost–benefit analysis is often also used to compare the value of competing options. This 
technique supplements the basic risk judgment approaches. For the comparison 
calculated risk to scenario risk tolerance criteria type of risk decision making, the 
calculated risk from is compared to a risk criteria that relates to some measure of 
maximum risk per scenario that the company will tolerate. Types of methods to be used: 
 Matrix Method: Risk matrices are a generalized method of visually showing the 
frequency tolerable for a scenario based on the consequence severity (Chapter 3) 
and the scenario frequency 
 Numerical Criteria Method (Maximum Tolerable Risk per Scenario): 
Develop risk criteria based on a maximum tolerable risk per scenario, based on a 
variety of consequence categories 
 Number of IPL Credits: Embedded the tolerable risk criteria in tables which 







RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this stage, student has managed to complete her project until determination of 
scenario frequencies and making risk decision. Completing this stage includes: 
 Step 1: Estimating Consequences and Severity 
 Step 2: Developing Scenarios 
 Step 3: Identifying Initiating Event Frequency 
 Step 4: Identifying Related IPLs 
 Step 5: Determining Scenario Frequency 
 Step 6: Making Risk Decision. Determine SIL 
 
Student has estimated the undesirable outcomes of accident scenarios. Then, student has 
developed the scenarios or sequence of events that results in an undesirable outcomes. 
Each scenario consists of two elements which are the initiating event that starts the chain 
of events and a consequence that results if the chain of events continues without 
interruption.  
 
After developing the scenarios, student identified initiating event frequency and related 
Independent Protection Layers (IPLs). There are 26 initiating events that have been 
listed in order to proceed with LOPA, refer to Table 4.1. The data for IPLs PFD also has 








No Initating Causes Likelihood of Failure (/yr) 
1 BPCS Instrument Loop Failure 1 x 10-1 
2 Regulator Failure 1 x 10-1 
3 Fixed Equipment Failure 1 x 10-2 
4 Pumps & other Rotating Equipments 1 x 10-1 
5 Cooling Water Failure 1 x 10-1 
6 Loss of Power 1 x 10-1 
7 Human Error (Routine task, 1 per day opportunity) 1 x 10-1 
8 Human Error(Routine Task, Once-per-month opportunity) 1 x 10-2 
9 Human Error ((Non-Routine Task, Low Stress) 1 x 10-1 
10 Human Error (Non-Routine Task, High Stress) 1 x 10-0 
11 Pressure Vessel Residual Failure 1 x 10-6 
12 Piping Residual Failure-100m-Ful Breach 1 x 10-5 
13 Piping Leak (10% section)-100m 1 x 10-3 
14 Atmosphere Tank Failure 1 x 10-3 
15 Gasket/Packing Blowout 1 x 10-2 
16 Turbine/Diesel Engine Over speed w/casing Breach 1 x 10-4 
17 3rd Party Intervention 1 x 10-2 
18 Lightning Strike 1 x 10-3 
19 Safety Valve Opens Spuriously 1 x 10-2 
20 Pump Seal Failure 1 x 10-1 
21 Unloading/Loading Hose Failure 1 x 10-1 
22 Small External Fire (aggregate causes) 1 x 10-1 
23 Large External Fire (aggregate causes) 1 x 10-2 
24 
LOTO Procedure *Failure (*overall failure of a  
multiple-element process 
1 x 10-3 per opportunity 
25 
Operator Failure (Routine procedure, well-trained, 
 unstressed, not fatigued) 













Assuming an adequate design basis 
and adequate  









Will reduce frequency of large 
consequences  
(widespread spill) of a tank 
overspill/rupture/spill etc 




Will reduce frequency of large 
consequences  
(widespread spill) of a tank 
overspill/rupture/spill etc 
1 x 10-2 - 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-2 
Opent Vent (No 
Valve) 
Will prevent overpressure 1 x 10-2 - 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-2 
Fireproofing 
Will reduce rate of heat input and 
provide additional 
time for depressurizing/firefighting 
etc 
1 x 10-2 - 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-2 
Blast-wall/Bunker 
Will reduce frequency of large 
consequences  
of an explosion by confining blast and 
protecting 
equipment/buildings etc 
1 x 10-2 - 1 x 10-3 1 x 10-3 
"Inherently Safe 
Design" 
If properly implemented can 
significantly reduce the  
frequency of consequences 
associated with a scenario.  
NOTE: The LOPA rule for some 
companies allow  
inherently safe design features to 
eliminate certain 
scenarios (e.g, vessel design pressure 
exceeds all 
possible high pressure challenges) 
1 x 10-1 - 1 x 10-6 1 x 10-2 
Flame/Detonation 
Arrestor 
If properly designed, installed and 
maintained these  
should eliminate the potential for 
flashback through  
a piping system or into a vessel or 
tank 








Assuming an adequate design basis 
and adequate  









Prevent system exceeding specified 
overpressure.  
Effectiveness of this device is sensitive 
to service  
and experience 
1 x 10-1 - 1 x 10-5 1 x 10-2 
Rupture Disc 
Prevent system exceeding specified 
overpressure.  
Effectiveness of this device is sensitive 
to service  
and experience 




Can be credited as an IPL if not 
associated with the 
initiating events being considered  
1 x 10-1 - 1 x 10-2 
(>1 x 10-1 allowed 
by 
IEC)  





See IEC 61508 (IEC, 1998) and IEC 61511 (IEC, 2001) for lufe cycle 
requirements and additional discussion 
SIL 1 
Typically consists of: 
Single sensor (redundant for fault 
tolerant) 
Single logic processor (redundant for 
fault tolerant) 
Single final element (redundant for 
fault tolerant) 
≥  1 x 10-2 - < 1 x 








a required PFD 
for o SIF  
SIL 2 
Typically consists of: 
"Multiple" sensor (for fault tolerant) 
"Multiple" channel logic processor (for 
fault tolerant) 
"Multiple" final element (for fault 
tolerant) 
≥  1 x 10-3 - < 1 x 
10-2 
SIL 3 
Typically consists of: 
Multiple sensor  
Multiple channel logic processor 
Multiple final element 






4.1 Event Tree Analysis 
 
After gathering all data and information, the scenario frequency could be determined. In 
this case, student used Event Tree Analysis method to develop the scenarios of each 
initiating events. These are the developed event tree for several initiating events: 
 
 BPCS Instrument Loop Failure (0.1) 
 
Safety Function (IPL) Inherently Safe Design Operator Response SIF Dike 
Identifier B  C  D E 






From Figure 4.1, the initiating cause is Basic Process Control Systems (BPCS). BPCS is 
designed to maintain the process in the safe region. Failure of BPCS will cause trouble 
to the plant itself. There are four Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) to prevent the 
undesirable outcomes to occur in this system. First protection layer is inherently safe 
design. Safe design, if properly implemented can significantly reduce the frequency of 
consequences associated with a scenario. Generally, all equipments in a plant are safely 
designed. Here, the frequency of the failure of safer design is 0.01. So, 0.09 is the 
frequency if the design is not properly safe. Operator response and alarm could be the 
second protection layer if the safer design is not properly functioned. The frequency for 
operator response failure is 0.1. Then, Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) should be 
third protection layer after operator response where it will function if the operator 
response is failed. SIFs are state control functions, sometimes called interlocks and 
safety critical alarms. Each of the SIFs will have its own PFD value based on: 
 The number and type of sensors, logic solvers and final control elements 
 The time interval between periodic functional tests of system components 
 
The failure frequency of this SIF is 0.01. The last layer is dike where dike will reduce 
the frequency of large consequences. The failure of dike function could lead to the 
potential undesirable outcomes. From the event tree above, potential fire, explosion and 
toxic release could happen if all of the IPLs are not functioned. The frequency of this 
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Above shows the scenario resulting from pressure vessel residual failure initiating cause.  
The failure frequency of this initiating event is 0.000001. There are four Independent 
Protection Layers (IPLs) to prevent the undesirable outcomes to occur in this system. 
First protection layer is inherently safe design. As mentioned before, safe design, if 
properly implemented can significantly reduce the frequency of consequences associated 
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with a scenario. In this case, the frequency of the failure of safer design is 0.01. Critical 
alarm and human intervention will be the second protection layer if the safer design is 
not properly functioned. The frequency for critical alarm and human intervention failure 
is 0.1. Then, Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) will be third protection layer after 
operator response where it will function if the operator response is failed. The failure 
frequency of this SIF here is 0.01. The last layer is relief valve where relief valve 
prevent system exceeding specified overpressure. Effectiveness of this device is 
sensitive to service and experience. Relief valve fail to function could lead to the 
potential undesirable outcomes. From the event tree above, potential fire, explosion and 
toxic release could happen if all of the IPLs are not functioned. The frequency of this 
scenario is 1E-13. 
 
 Pump Seal Failure (0.1) 
 
Safety Function: Inherently Safe Design Operator Response 
Identifier B C 







Above shows the scenario resulting from pump seal failure initiating cause. The failure 
frequency of this initiating event is 0.1. Two Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) 
involve in this system. First protection layer is inherently safe design. The frequency of 
the failure of safer design is 0.01. Operator response will be the second protection layer 
if the safer design is not properly functioned. The frequency for operator response 
failure is 0.1. From the event tree above, potential fire, explosion and toxic release could 




 Small External Fire (0.1) 
 
Safety Function: Inherently Safe Design Operator Response Pressure Relief Valve Dike 
Identifier B C D E 






That even tree shows the scenario resulting from pressure vessel residual failure 
initiating cause. The failure frequency of this initiating event is 0.1. There are four 
Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) to prevent the undesirable outcomes to occur in 
this system. First protection layer is inherently safe design. In this case, the frequency of 
the failure of safer design is 0.01. Operator response will be the second protection layer 
if the safer design is not properly functioned. The frequency for operator response 
failure is 0.1.  Then, the third layer is relief valve where relief valve prevent system 
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exceeding specified overpressure. The frequency of relief valve failure is 0.01. The last 
layer of protection is dike. Frequency of dike to fail per year is 0.01. From the event tree 
above, potential fire, explosion and toxic release could happen if all of the IPLs are not 
functioned. The frequency of this scenario is 0.00000001. 
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Above shows the scenario resulting from loss of power initiating cause. The failure 
frequency of this initiating event is 0. 1. There are four Independent Protection Layers 
(IPLs) to prevent the undesirable outcomes to occur in this system. First protection layer 
is inherently safe design. In this case, the frequency of the failure of safer design is 0.01. 
Basic Process Control System (BPCS) will be the second protection layer if the safer 
design is not properly functioned. The frequency for BPCS failure is 0.1. When 
considering using the BPCS as an IPL, the analyst must evaluate the effectiveness of the 
access control and security systems as must evaluate error can degrade the performance 
of the BPCS. Then, alarm and operator response will be third protection layer after 
operator response where it will function if the operator response is failed. The failure 
frequency of alarm and operator response is 0.1. Then, SIFs will be next protection layer 
after alarm and operator response where it will function if the before protection layer is 
failed to respond. The failure frequency of this SIF here is 0.01. The last layer is relief 
valve where relief valve prevent system exceeding specified overpressure. Relief valve 
fail to function could lead to the potential undesirable outcomes. Frequency of relief 
valve failure in this case is 0.01. From the event tree above, potential fire, explosion and 
toxic release could happen if all of the IPLs are not functioned. The frequency of this 
scenario is 0.000000001. 
 
From the results above, we can see that an event tree includes the initiating events, the 
consequences which are the safety function and the possible outcomes. All of them will 
combine to form scenario consequences which will represent in event tree analysis form. 
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fi
C = fi
I x ∏ PFDij 
                      j=1 









 is the frequency for consequence C for initiating event i 
fi
I
 is the initiating event frequency for initiating event i 
PFDij is the probability of failure on demand of the jth IPL that protects against 
consequence C for initiating event i. 
The above equation is applicable for low demand situations—that is, fi
I
 is less than twice 
the test frequency for the first IPL. 
 
4.2 Making Risk Decision 
 
In making risk decision, tolerance risk frequency will be the benchmark to the calculated 
risk frequency. So, the calculated risk frequency will be compared to the tolerance risk 
frequency. In LOPA, LOPA ratio has to be calculated to make risk decision. The 
calculated ratio will determine whether the system is reliable or not reliable In general, 
LOPA ratio is used to make judgment whether the IPLs or safeguards available in the 
system is applicable to prevent undesired outcomes. To calculate LOPA ratio, the 






Tolerance risk frequency can be obtained from historical data, a company itself and 
expertise. Scenario frequency is the frequency that was calculated above. Below are the 
criteria for LOPA ratio: 
 If LOPA ratio ≥ 1.0, no need to add other IPLs 
 If LOPA ratio ≤ 1.0, has to add other IPLs (SIL), and determine SIL 
 
 
LOPA Ratio = Tolerance Risk Frequency 
       Scenario Frequency 
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In the calculation to determine LOPA ratio, the frequency of SIF is not included. This is 
to determine the level of safety integrity (SIL).  
 
 




Figure 4.2.2: Typical Data Related to Risk Tolerance Criteria 
 
All values above have units of probability of death per year for an individual. Below 
shows the steps involve to calculate LOPA ratio, thus determining the SIL: 
 
 4.0.1 BPCS Instrument Loop Failure 
From Figure 4.6, risk tolerance frequency for general industry (chemical, 




 (probability of death per year). Take 
maximum allowable risk, 10
-5 






LOPA Ratio Risk 
Tolerance/Scenario 
Frequency 
   
LOPA Ratio = 10 
Table 4.2.1 
 
Scenario frequency: fBPCS Instrument Loop Failure x fInherently Safe Design x fOperator Response x 
fDike 
Since LR ≥ 1, no need to add other independent protection layers (IPL). So, IPLs 
are applicable and risk is tolerable. 
 
 4.0.2 Pressure Vessel Residual Failure  
 
 Maximum allowable risk frequency: 10
-5 
 
LOPA Ratio Risk Tolerance/Scenario 
Frequency 
   
LOPA Ratio = 1000000 
Table 4.2.2 
 
Scenario frequency: fPressure Vessel Residual Failure x fInherently Safe Design x f Critical Alarms & 
Human Intervention x f Relief Valve 
Since LR ≥ 1, no need to add other independent protection layers (IPL). So, IPLs 




 4.0.3 Pump Seal Failure 
 
 Maximum allowable risk frequency: 10
-5 
 




   
LOPA Ratio = 0.1 
Table 4.2.3 
 
Scenario frequency: fPump Seal Failure x fInherently Safe Design x fOperator  
 From above result, LOPA ratio is 0.1 ≤ 1.0. So, the risk is not reliable and need 
to add other IPLs to ensure that the LOPA ratio reaches 1.0 or above 1.0. To 
determine the level of safety integrity level, the gap is calculated. Thus, to ensure 
the LOPA ratio reaches 1.0, an SIL with frequency 10
-1 
is required.  
 
So, SIL to be added= Risk tolerance / Scenario 
Frequency x 0.1 
   
New LOPA Ratio= 1.0 (risk is acceptable) 
Table 4.2.4 
 






 4.0.3 Small External Fire 
 Maximum allowable risk frequency: 10
-5 
LOPA Ratio Risk 
Tolerance/Scenario 
Frequency 
   
LOPA Ratio = 1000 
Table 4.2.5 
 
Scenario frequency: fSmall External Fire x fInherently Safe Design   x fOperator Response  x  fRelief Valve 
x f Dike 
Since LR ≥ 1, no need to add other independent protection layers (IPL). So, IPLs 
are applicable and risk is tolerable. 
 
4.0.3 Loss of Power 
 
LOPA Ratio Risk Tolerance/Scenario 
Frequency 
   
LOPA Ratio = 100 
Table 4.2.6 
 
Scenario frequency: fLoss of Power x fInherently Safe Design   x fBPCS x  fAlarm & Operator Response  x 
fRelief Valve 
Since LR ≥ 1, no need to add other independent protection layers (IPL). So, IPLs 





CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It can be concluded that the whole project involves analysis tool in determining the SIL 
for hazardous installation. The methodology provided by LOPA help in achieving the 
risk decision making. In conclusion, LOPA help in classifying Safety Instrumented 
Function (SIF) to determine the appropriate SIL. Estimating consequence and severity is 
the initial step to proceed with LOPA. From this estimating consequence and severity, 
the scenario which is the unplanned event or the sequence of events that result in an 
undesirable consequence can be developed. Then, initiating event frequency can be 
identified. When all of those steps are completed, related Independent Protection Layers 
(IPLs) should be identified. During this stage, the PFD data should be determined. After 
all information is gathered, the scenario frequency can be determined. Risk decision can 
be made by comparing the calculated scenario frequency with the tolerable risk 
frequency. Risk has to be compared with allowable risk to ensure that the system in the 
plant is in inherently safe design. LOPA facilitates the determination of more precise 
cause-consequence pair, and therefore improves scenario identification. LOPA also 
helps resolve conflicts in decision making by providing a consistent, simplified 
framework for estimating the risk of a scenario and provides a common language for 
discussing risk. In other words, LOPA helps in risk decision making steps. For future 
work, it is recommended to apply this LOPA in specific unit or system because this 
project is applied for general cases. Because in this project involve semi-quantitative 
method, it is recommended to further this study to quantitative method which involve 
more mathematical tools to evaluate the scenario for potential fire, explosion and toxic 
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